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Abstract—We propose a new formal criterion for secure
compilation, giving strong end-to-end security guarantees for
software components written in unsafe, low-level languages with
C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion is the first to model
dynamic compromise in a system of mutually distrustful compo-
nents running with least privilege. Each component is protected
from all the others—in particular, from components that have
encountered undefined behavior and become compromised. Each
component receives secure compilation guarantees up to the point
when it becomes compromised, after which an attacker can take
complete control over the component and use any of its privileges
to attack the remaining uncompromised components. More
precisely, we ensure that dynamically compromised components
cannot break the safety properties of the system at the target level
any more than equally privileged components without undefined
behavior already could in the source language.
To illustrate this model, we build a secure compilation chain for
an unsafe language with buffers, procedures, and components.
We compile it to a simple RISC abstract machine with built-
in compartmentalization and provide thorough proofs, many of
them machine-checked in Coq, showing that the compiler satisfies
our secure compilation criterion. Finally, we show that the
protection guarantees offered by the compartmentalized abstract
machine can be achieved at the machine-code level using either
software fault isolation or a tag-based reference monitor.
1 Introduction
Compartmentalization offers a strong, practical defense
against a range of devastating low-level attacks, such as
control-flow hijacking exploiting buffer and integer over-
flow vulnerabilities in type and memory unsafe languages
such as C and C++ [17], [34], [81]. A variety of com-
partmentalization technologies are widely deployed, including
process-level privilege separation [17], [34], [47] (used in
OpenSSH [65] and for sandboxing plugins and tabs in web
browsers [67]), software fault isolation [73], [78] (e.g., Google
Native Client [84]), modules in WebAssembly [36] (in modern
web browsers), and hardware enclaves (e.g., Intel SGX [39]);
many more are on the drawing boards [13], [19], [70], [81].
These mechanisms are a good basis for building more secure
compilation chains that mitigate low-level attacks [30], [34],
[44], [64], [75]–[77]. In particular, compartmentalization can
be applied in unsafe low-level languages like C and C++ to
structure large, performance-critical applications into mutually
distrustful components that run with minimal privileges and
interact only via well-defined interfaces.
Intuitively, protecting each component from all the others
should have strong security benefits, since a vulnerability in
one component need not compromise the security of the whole
application. Instead, each component should be protected from
all the other components until it becomes compromised by
an exploit of one of its vulnerabilities, causing it to attack
the remaining uncompromised components. The goal of this
paper is to formalize this dynamic compromise intuition by
precisely characterizing what it means for a compilation chain
to be secure in this setting.
We want a characterization that supports source-level se-
curity reasoning, so that programmers can reason soundly
about the security of their code without thinking about the
complex details of the whole compilation chain (compiler,
linker, loader, runtime system, system software, etc). What
makes this particularly challenging for C and C++ is that
their semantics, as described in standards documents and as
implemented by compilers, call out a large number of “unde-
fined behaviors” that have no source-level meaning whatsoever
and are simply assumed never to occur. On programs that do
have undefined behavior, standards-compliant compilers for
these languages are allowed to generate code that does literally
anything—in particular, anything a remote attacker may want.
Compilers aggressively exploit the assumption of no undefined
behavior to produce the fastest possible code for well-defined
programs, often leading to exploitable vulnerabilities when
the assumption is broken [38], [72]—and to serious confusion
even among experienced C/C++ developers, who generally ex-
pect saner behavior [37], [53], [56], [68], [79], [80]. To obtain
strong security guarantees, we make a worst-case assumption
that any undefined behavior can lead to compromise.
The purpose of a compartmentalizing compilation chain
is to ensure that the arbitrary effects of undefined behavior
are limited to the component in which it occurs. For a
start, we restrict the spatial scope of a compromise to the
component that encounters undefined behavior. Such com-
promised components can only influence other components
via controlled interactions respecting their interfaces and the
other abstractions of the high-level language (e.g., procedure
calls and returns). Perhaps unsurprisingly, to support a model
of dynamic compromise, in which a component receives full
guarantees until it encounters undefined behavior, we also






















We do so by requiring that compiler optimizations do not
cause undefined behavior to happen before earlier observable
events (e.g., system calls). This additional restriction is easier
to enforce than the spatial one described above—indeed, the
CompCert verified C compiler [54] provably satisfies it, giving
its users a saner model of undefined behavior than other C
compilers [66].
We also want a characterization that is formal—that clarifies
and brings mathematical precision to the security guarantees
and attacker model of compartmentalizing compilation. In
particular, we want a characterization of sound source-level
reasoning principles that can be used to assess the security of
compartmentalized applications using either formal verifica-
tion tools or manual security audits. A formal characterization
can further serve as a specification for formally verifying
the correctness of secure compilation chains, and as useful
guidance for designing and building unverified ones.
Our correctness criterion improves on existing ones in
three respects. First, unlike most criteria for formally secure
compilation [2], [4]–[7], [28], [29], [52], [62], it applies to
compartmentalized programs, rather than being phrased in
terms of protecting a single trusted program from an untrusted
context. Second, unlike some recent characterizations that do
consider modular protection [23], [64], it applies to unsafe
languages with undefined behaviors at the source level. And
third, it considers a dynamic compromise model—a significant
advance over the proposal of Juglaret et al. [43], which does
consider mutually distrustful components written in unsafe
languages, but which only supports a static compromise model
where components get no security guarantees whatsoever if
they can encounter undefined behavior in any context.
The limitation to static compromise scenarios actually
seems inherent to previous techniques, which are all based
on the formal criterion of full abstraction [2]. We support
dynamic compromise by taking the somewhat radical step
of dropping full abstraction and instead phrasing security
in terms of preserving safety properties [50] in adversarial
contexts [29]. Moving away from full abstraction also makes
our criterion easier (and more efficient) to achieve in practice
and to prove at scale.
Contributions Our first contribution is Robustly Safe Com-
partmentalizing Compilation (RSCC), a new secure compi-
lation criterion providing strong end-to-end security guaran-
tees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages
with C-style undefined behavior. This criterion is the first
to support dynamic compromise in a system of mutually
distrustful components running with least privilege. We start
by illustrating the intuition and informal attacker model and
source-level security reasoning behind RSCC using a simple
example application (§2).
Our second contribution is to formalize RSCC (§3). We
start from Robustly Safe Compilation (RSC, §3.1) a simple
security criterion recently introduced by Garg et al. [29], and
incrementally extend this to dynamic compromise (RSCDC,
§3.2) and mutually distrustful components (RSCDCMD, §3.3),
which we use as a base for defining RSCC (§3.4). We also
propose an effective and general proof technique for RSCDC
(§A). First, we show that RSCC—the most direct incarnation
of our intuitive attacker model—follows from the simper
RSCDCMD. We then reduce RSC
DC
MD to: (1) constructing, from any
target-level finite prefix of a trace of cross-component calls
and returns, a whole source-level program that will produce
that prefix; (2) using standard simulation proofs to show trace
decomposition and composition lemmas that relate our seman-
tics for whole programs to generically constructed semantics
that work on partial programs; and (3) using a whole-program
compiler correctness proof à la CompCert [54] as a black-
box for moving back and forth between the source and target
languages. This novel proof technique yields significantly
simpler and more scalable proofs than previous work in this
space [43], [64] (as explained in detail in §6 and §A).
Our third contribution is a proof-of-concept secure compi-
lation chain for an unsafe language featuring buffers, proce-
dures, components, and a CompCert-like block-based memory
model [55]. Our entire compilation chain is implemented in
the Coq proof assistant. The first part of the chain compiles
our source language to a simple RISC abstract machine with
built-in compartmentalization (§4). We use our proof technique
to construct careful proofs–many of them machine-checked in
Coq—showing that this compiler satisfies RSCC (§B). Finally,
we describe two back ends for our compiler, showing that
the protection guarantees of the compartmentalized abstract
machine can be achieved at the lowest level using either
software fault isolation (SFI, §5.1) or a tag-based reference
monitor (§5.2). Both back ends are implemented in Coq.
Neither has yet been verified, but we have used property-based
testing to gain confidence that the SFI back end satisfies the
invariants of the compartmentalized machine.
We close by discussing related work (§6) and future di-
rections (§7). The appendices describe our general proof
technique and other details that had to be omitted for space.
Our Coq development (around 20,000LOC) is available as sup-
plemental material at https://github.com/secure-compilation
2 RSCC By Example
We begin with an intuitive explanation of compartmentalizing
compilation chains, of our attacker model, and of how viewing
this model as a dynamic compromise game leads to intuitive
principles for security analysis.
We need not be very precise, here, about the details of the
source language; we just assume that it is equipped with some
compartmentalization facility [35] that allows programmers to
break up security-critical applications into mutually distrustful
components that run with minimal privileges and can only
interact via well-defined interfaces. We also assume that the
interface of each component gives a precise description of
its privilege. The notions of component and interface that
we use for defining our secure compilation criteria in §3
are quite generic: interfaces can include any information that
can be enforced on components, including type signatures,
lists of allowed system calls, or more detailed access control
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specifications describing legal parameters to cross-component
calls (e.g., ACLs for files). We assume that the division of
an application into components and the interfaces of those
components are statically determined and fixed throughout
execution. For the illustrative language of §4, we will use a
simple and rather rigid notion of components and interfaces,
where components don’t directly share state, interfaces just
list the procedures that components provide and those that
they expect their environment to provide, and the only thing
one component can do to another one is to call procedures
allowed by the interfaces of both components.
The goal of a compartmentalizing compilation chain is to
ensure that components interact according to their interfaces
even in the presence of undefined behavior. Our security
criteria do not fix a specific mechanism for achieving this:
this responsibility can be divided among the different parts of
the compilation chain, such as the compiler, linker, loader,
runtime system, system software, and hardware. In §5 we
study a compilation chain whose back ends use inline and tag-
based reference monitoring for compartmentalization. What a
compromised component can still do in this model is to use its
access to other components, as allowed by its interface, to trick
them into misusing their own privileges (i.e., confused deputy
attacks) and to compromise them as well—e.g., by sending
them malformed inputs that trigger control-hijacking attacks.
In the examples below, we model input and output as
interaction with a designated environment component E that
is given an interface but no implementation. When invoked,
environment functions are assumed to immediately return a
value non-deterministically [54]. In terms of security, the
environment is thus the initial source of arbitrary, possibly
malformed, inputs that can exploit buffer overflows and other
vulnerabilities to compromise other components.
In practice, it is generally unrealistic to assume that we
know in advance which components will be compromised
and which ones will not. This motivates our novel model of
dynamic compromise in which each component receives full
guarantees until it becomes compromised by encountering an
undefined behavior, causing it to start attacking the remaining
uncompromised components. In practical attacks, these com-
promises are ultimately caused by malicious inputs fed to the
application.
This model allows developers to reason informally about
various dynamic compromise scenarios and their impact on
the security of the whole application [34]. If the practical
consequences of some plausible dynamic compromise scenario
are too serious, developers can further reduce or separate
privilege by narrowing interfaces or splitting components, or
they can make components more defensive by dynamically
validating the inputs they receive from other components.
As a first running example, consider the pseudocode of the
simple, idealized application from Figure 1. It defines three
interacting components C0, C1, and C2 that use the environment
E for input (E.read) and output (E.write). Component C1
defines the main() procedure, which first invokes C2.init(),
then reads a request x from the environment (e.g., from some
remote client), parses it using a private procedure (omitted
here) to obtain y, and then invokes C2.process(x,y). This
procedure then calls C2.prepare() and C2.handle(y), obtain-
ing some data that it validates using C0.valid, and if this
succeeds writes the data together with the original request x
to the environment (e.g., to disk, to a database, etc).
Suppose we would like to establish two properties:
(S1) the application only writes valid data (i.e. data for which
C0.valid returns true); and
(S2) any call E.write(<data,x>) happens as a response to a
previous E.read() call by C1 obtaining the request x.
These can be shown to hold of executions that do not exhibit
undefined behavior simply by analyzing the control flow. But
what if undefined behavior does occur? Suppose that we can
rule out this possibility—by careful inspection, testing, or
formal verification—for simple parts of the code, but are still
unsure about three subroutines:
(V1) C1.parse(x) performs complex array computations, and
we do not know if it is immune to buffer overflows on
all inputs x.
(V2) C2.prepare() is intended to be called only if C2.init()
has been called beforehand to set up a shared data
structure; otherwise, it might dereference a pointer with
an undefined value.
(V3) C2.handle(y) might integer overflow on some inputs y.
If the undefined behavior in V1 occurs, then C1 can get
compromised and call C2.process(x,y) with values of x that
it hasn’t received from the environment, thus invalidating S2.
Nevertheless, if no other undefined behavior is encountered
during the execution, this attack cannot have any effect on the
code run by C2, so S1 remains true.
Now consider the possible undefined behavior from V2.
If C1 is not compromised, this undefined behavior cannot
occur, since C2.init() will be called before C2.prepare().
Moreover, this undefined behavior cannot occur even if C1 is
compromised by encountering the undefined behavior in V1,
because that can only occur after C2.init() has been called.
Hence V1 and V2 together are no worse than V1 alone, and
property S1 remains true. Inferring this property crucially de-
pends on our model of dynamic compromise, in which C1 can
be treated as honest and gets full guarantees until it encounters
undefined behavior. If instead we were only allowed to reason
about C1’s ability to do damage based on its interface, as
would happen in a model of static compromise [43], we
wouldn’t be able to conclude that C2 cannot be compromised:
an arbitrary component with the same interface as C1 could
indeed compromise C2 by calling C2.process before C2.init.
Finally, if the execution encounters the undefined behavior
in V3, then C2 can get compromised, irrespective of whether
C1 is compromised beforehand or not. The compromise of C2
invalidates both S1 and S2.
Even if still informal for now, this security analysis already
identifies C2 as a single point of failure for both properties
of our system. There are many ways the developers of this




valid ( data ) { . . . }
}
component C1 {
import E . read , C2 . init , C2 . process ;
main ( ) {
C2 . init ( ) ;
x := E . read ( ) ;
y := C1 . parse ( x ) ; / / (V1 ) can UNDEF f o r some x
C2 . process (x , y ) ;
}
parse ( x ) { . . . }
}
component C2 {
import E . write , C0 . valid ;
export init , process ;
init ( ) { . . . }
process (x , y ) {
C2 . prepare ( ) ; / / (V2 ) can UNDEF i f n o t i n i t i a l i z e d
data := C2 . handle ( y ) ; / / (V3 ) can UNDEF f o r some y
if C0 . valid ( data ) then E . write(<data , x>)
}
prepare ( ) { . . . }
handle ( y ) { . . . }
}
Figure 1: Pseudocode of application broken into components
could improve the code in C2.handle to reduce the chances
of encountering undefined behavior, e.g. by doing better input
validation. They could also make C1 check the values it
sends into C2.process, so that an attacker would have to
compromise both C1 and C2 to break the validity of writes.
For ensuring the correspondence of reads and writes despite
the compromise of C1 they could make C2 also read the request
values directly from E, instead of only via C1.
To achieve the best security though, the read and write
privileges can be delegated to C0, which performs no complex
data processing of its own and thus is a lot less likely to be
compromised by undefined behavior. In this new variant of our
application (Figure 2), component C0 reads a request, calls
C1.parse on this request, passes the parse to C2.process,
validates the data C2 returns and then writes it out. This
way both our desired properties hold even if both C1 and C2
are compromised, since now the core application logic and
privileges have been completely separated from the dangerous
data processing operations that could cause vulnerabilities.
Since such a neat privilege separation is not always possible in
practice though, we want a security criterion that can reason
about all kinds of component partitionings.
The first step towards making this more formal is to make
the security goals of our example application more precise. We
do this in terms of execution traces that are built from events
such as calling a procedure from another component and
returning to another component. The two intuitive properties
from our example can be phrased in terms of traces as follows:
If E.write(<data,x>) appears in an execution trace of the
program then it must better be the case that:
(S1) E.read was called before in the trace and returned x;
(S2) C0.valid(data) was called before and returned true.
The application variant from Figure 2 achieves these strong
properties despite the dynamic compromise of both C1 via V1
and C2 via V3, but for the variant from Figure 1 the properties
component C0 {
import E . read , E . write , C2 . init , C1 . parse , C2 . process ;
main ( ) {
C2 . init ( ) ;
x := E . read ( ) ;
y := C1 . parse ( x ) ;
data := C2 . process ( y ) ;
if C0 . valid ( data ) then E . write(<data , x>)
}




parse ( x ) { . . . } / / (V1 ) can UNDEF f o r some x
}
component C2 {
export init , process ;
init ( ) { . . . }
process ( y ) {
C2 . prepare ( ) ; / / (V2 ) can UNDEF i f n o t i n i t i a l i z e d
data := C2 . handle ( y ) ; / / (V3 ) can UNDEF f o r some y
}
prepare ( ) { . . . }
handle ( y ) { . . . }
}
Figure 2: More secure variant of our application
need to be weakened as follows: If E.write(<data,x>)
appears in an execution trace then
(W1) E.read returned x before or E.read returned x’ before
that can cause undefined behavior in C1.parse(x’) or
C2.process(x,y) was called before with a y that can
cause undefined behavior in C2.handle(y);
(W2) C0.valid(data) was called before and returned true or
C2.process(x,y) was called before with a y that can
cause undefined behavior in C2.handle(y).
While these properties are much weaker, they are still not
trivial and require an attacker to actually find and send
the inputs that break the guarantees of the application by
compromising C1 or C2.
Properties S1, S2, W1 and W2 are all safety properties [50],
in this case inspired by the “correspondence assertions” used to
specify authenticity in security protocols [31], [83]. Intuitively,
a trace property is a safety property if it can be invalidated by
a finite trace prefix and once it is invalidated by such a “bad
prefix” it can no longer be restored. For instance here is a bad
prefix for S2 that includes a call to E.write(<data,x>) with
no preceding call to C0.valid(data):
[ C0 . main ( ) ; C2 . init ( ) ; Ret ; E . read ; Ret ( x ) ; C1 . parse ( x ) ;
Ret ( y ) ; C2 . process ( y ) ; Ret ( data ) ; E . write(<data , x>)]
While the program from Figure 2 cannot produce traces with
this bad prefix, it could if we were to remove the validity check
in C0.main(), which would invalidate safety property S2.
Compiler correctness is most often phrased in terms of
preserving trace properties in general [54], and thus safety
properties as a very important special case. Compiler cor-
rectness stops applying, however, as soon the program has
an undefined behavior, and all security guarantees are lost
globally. Instead, we want our secure compiler to enforce that
dynamically compromised components are not able to break




∀m finite prefix of t (m ≤ t)
∃ a dynamic compromise scenario explaining m in source
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Where prefixes m, m1, m2 could for instance be:
m =[C0 . main ( ) ; C2 . init ( ) ; Ret ; E . read ; Ret ( x ) ; C1 . parse ( x ) ;
Ret ( y ) ; C2 . process ( y ) ; Ret ( d ) ;
C0 . valid ( d ) ; Ret ( true ) ; E . write(<d , x>)]
m1 =[C0 . main ( ) ; C2 . init ( ) ; Ret ; E . read ; Ret ( x ) ; C1 . parse ( x ) ]
m2 =[C0 . main ( ) ; C2 . init ( ) ; Ret ; E . read ; Ret ( x ) ; C1 . parse ( x ) ;
Ret ( y ) ; C2 . process ( y ) ]
Figure 3: The RSCC dynamic compromise game for our run-
ning example. We start with all components being uncompro-
mised (in green) and incrementally replace any component that
encounters undefined behavior with an arbitrary component (in
red) that has the same interface and will do its part of the trace
prefix m without causing undefined behavior.
more than equally privileged components without undefined
behavior already could in the source language.
We phrase Robustly Safe Compartmentalizing Compilation
(RSCC) in terms of a security game that we illustrate in
Figure 3 for our running example. With an RSCC compila-
tion chain, given any execution of the compiled and linked
components C0↓, C1↓ and, C2↓ producing trace t in the target
language, we can explain any finite (bad) prefix m of t (written
m ≤ t) in terms of the source language. As soon as any
component of the program has an undefined behavior though,
the semantics of the source language can no longer directly
help us. As done by CompCert [54], we model undefined
behavior in our source language as a special Undef(Ci) event
terminating the trace, and whatever happens afterwards at
the target level for the component Ci that encountered the
undefined behavior can no longer be explained in terms of
its source code. For instance, in step 0 of Figure 3 component
C1 is the first to encounter undefined behavior after producing
a prefix m1 of m.
How can we explain the rest of m in the source language?
Our solution in RSCC is to require that one can replace C1, the
component that encountered undefined behavior, with some
other source component A1 that has the same interface and
can produce its part of the whole m in the source language
without itself encountering undefined behavior. In order to
replace component C1 with A1 we have to go back in time
and re-execute the program from the beginning obtaining a
longer trace, in this case m2; Undef(C2) (where we write ; for
appending the element E.write(<data,x>) to m). We iterate
this process until all components that encountered undefined
behavior have been replaced with new source components that
do not encounter undefined behavior and produce the whole
trace m. In the example dynamic compromise scenario from
Figure 3, this means replacing C1 with A1 and C2 with A2,
after which the program can produce the whole prefix m in
the source language.
Let’s now use this RSCC security game to deduce that
in our example from Figure 2, even compromising both
C1 and C2 does not break property S2 at the target level.
Assume by contradiction that a trace of our compiled program
breaks property S2. Then there exists a minimal finite prefix
“m; E.write(<data,x>)” such that C0.valid(data) does
not appear in m. Using RSCC we obtain that there exists
a dynamic compromise scenario explaining m in the source.
The most interesting case is when this scenario involves the
compromise of both C1 and C2 as in Figure 3. In this case,
replacing C1 and C2 with arbitrary A1 and A2 with the same
interfaces allows us to reproduce the whole bad prefix m in
the source (step 2). We can now reason in the source, either
informally or using a program logic for robust safety [71],
that this cannot happen, since the source code of C0 does call
C0.valid(data) and only if it gets true back does it call
E.write(<data,x>).
While in this special case we have only used the last step
in the dynamic compromise sequence where all compromised
components have already been replaced (step 2 from Figure 3),
the previous steps are also useful in general for reasoning
about the code our original components execute before they
get compromised. For instance, this kind of reasoning becomes
crucial for showing property W2 for the original example from
Figure 1. Property W2 gives up on the validity of the written
data only if C2 receives a y that exploits C2.handle(y) (vul-
nerability V3). However, as discussed earlier a compromised
C1 could, at least in theory, try to compromise C2 by calling
C2.process without proper initialization (exploiting vulnera-
bility V2). Showing that this cannot actually happen requires
us to use step 0 of the game from Figure 3, which gives us
that the original compiled program obtained by linking C0↓,
C1↓ and, C2↓ can produce the trace m1; Undef(C1), for some
prefix m1 of the bad trace prefix in which C2.process is called
without calling C2.init first. However, we can easily convince
ourselves (or formally verify) that the straight-line code of the
C1.main() procedure can only cause undefined behavior after
it has called C2.init, which leads to a contradiction with the
existence of a bad trace exploiting V2.
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3 Formally Defining RSCC
In the previous section we introduced the intuition behind
RSCC, our novel criterion for secure compilation of compo-
nents written in unsafe, low-level languages. We now step back
and provide a formal definition for RSCC.
Our starting point is a simple notion of Robustly Safe
Compilation (RSC) (§3.1), which we first extend to unsafe
languages with C-style undefined behavior, providing a novel
model of dynamic compromise in which a partial program
P receives secure compilation guarantees until P encounters
undefined behavior (§3.2). We then further extend this to
protecting a set of mutually distrustful components running
with least privilege from their untrusted context, obtaining a
new property we call RSCDCMD (§3.3). Using these ideas, we
formalize RSCC (§3.4), which (compared to RSCDCMD) trades off
some simplicity for directly capturing the informal dynamic
compromise game from §2.
While the definitions in this section are general, and could
thus apply in a variety of settings, the next section will
illustrate their instantiation to our concrete compilation chain.
3.1 RSC: Robustly Safe Compilation
We start from RSC, a criterion for secure compilation recently
proposed by Garg et al. [29], which is equivalent to the
preservation of all safety properties against adversarial low-
level contexts, i.e., preservation of robust safety [32], [49],
[71]. We focus on preserving robust safety since it captures
many important properties of programs (e.g., robust partial
correctness), while also allowing for a simple secure com-
pilation proof technique (see Definability in §A.2). Safety
properties [50] are often stated in terms of potentially infinite
traces built over events such as inputs from and outputs
to the environment [54]. We write P t to mean that the
complete program P can produce trace t with respect to some
operational semantics. Armed with this, RSC can be stated as
a property of a whole compilation chain: the source language
and its trace-based big-step operational semantics (P t),
compiler (P↓), source and target linkers (CS [P ] and CT [PT ]),
and target-level semantics (PT t) including for instance the
loader, target machine, and deployed protection mechanisms:
Definition 3.1. A compilation chain provides RSC iff
∀P CT t. CT [P↓] t⇒ ∀m≤t. ∃CS t′. CS [P ] t′ ∧m≤t′
For any partial source program P and any (intuitively
adversarial) target context CT where CT linked with the
compilation of P can produce a trace t in the target language
(CT [P ↓] t), and for any (bad) finite prefix m of trace t
(written m ≤ t) we can construct a(n adversarial) source-
level context CS that can produce prefix m in the source
language when linked with P (i.e., CS [P ] t′ for some t′ so
that m ≤ t′). Intuitively, any finite attack m that target context
CT can mount against P↓ can already be mounted against P
by some source context CS . So proving RSC requires one to
be able to back-translate each finite prefix m of CT [P↓] into a
source context CS that performs m together with the original
program P . Conversely, any safety property that holds of P
when linked with an arbitrary source context will still hold for
P↓ when linked with an arbitrary target context [29].
As is the case for CompCert and our simple compiler from
§4, we assume for simplicity that the traces are exactly the
same in the source and target languages. However, it would
be easy to extend the formal development from this section to
an arbitrary relation between source and target traces.
3.2 RSCDC: Dynamic Compromise
The RSC criterion above is about protecting a partial program
written in a safe source language against adversarial target-
level contexts. We now adapt the idea behind RSC to protecting
partial programs written in an unsafe source language, with
C-style undefined behavior. As explained in §2, we model
undefined behavior in the source language as a special Undef
event terminating the trace: whatever happens afterwards at
the target level can no longer be explained in terms of the
code of the source program. We further assume that undefined
behaviors in the source language can be attributed to the
part of the program that causes them via the Undef(P ) and
Undef(C) events (while in §3.3 we will blame the component
encountering undefined behavior).
Definition 3.2. A compilation chain provides Robustly Safe
Compilation with Dynamic Compromise (RSCDC) iff
∀P CT t. CT [P↓] t⇒
∀m≤t. ∃CS t′. CS [P ] t′ ∧ (m≤t′∨t′≺Pm)
Instead of always requiring as in RSC that the trace t′
produced by CS [P ] contain the entire prefix m (i.e., m≤t′),
we also allow t′ to be itself a prefix of m followed by an
undefined behavior in P , which we write as t′≺Pm (i.e.,
t′≺Pm , ∃m′≤m. t′=(m′; Undef(P ))). To facilitate source-
level reasoning we do not allow contexts CS to encounter
undefined behaviors. However, even such a well-behaved
context can sometimes trigger an undefined behavior in the
protected program P , in which case there is no way to keep
providing guarantees to P going forward. P does nevertheless
receive secure compilation guarantees until the last trace event
before the undefined behavior.
Like in CompCert [54], [66], we treat undefined behaviors
as observable events in the execution trace, which allows
the compiler to perform optimizations that move undefined
behaviors earlier in the execution order past any operations
that do not cause events, but prevents the compiler from
moving undefined behaviors before earlier observable events.
While some C compilers would need to be adapted to respect
this discipline [66], limiting the temporal scope of undefined
behavior is a strong prerequisite for achieving security against
dynamic compromise. Moreover, if trace events are coarse
enough (e.g., system calls and cross-component calls) we
expect this restriction to have a negligible performance impact
in most cases.
Since RSC corresponds exactly to preserving robust safety
properties [29], one might wonder what properties RSCDC
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preserves. We proved that RSCDC corresponds exactly to pre-
serving the following class ZP against an adversarial context:
Definition 3.3. ZP , Safety ∩ Closed≺P , where
Closed≺P , {π | ∀t∈π. ∀t′. t≺P t′ ⇒ t′∈π}
= {π | ∀t′ 6∈π. ∀t. t≺P t′ ⇒ t 6∈π}
The class of properties ZP is defined as the intersection of
Safety and a new class Closed≺P of properties closed under
extension of traces with undefined behavior in P . If a property
π is in Closed≺P and it allows a trace t that ends with an
undefined behavior in P—i.e., ∃m. t=(m;Undef(P ))—then
π should also allow any extension of the trace m—i.e., any
trace t′ that has m as a prefix. Conversely, if a property π
in Closed≺P rejects a trace t
′, then for any prefix m of t′
the property π should also reject the trace m;Undef(P ). The
intuition is simple: the secure compiler is free to implement
a trace with undefined behavior in P as an arbitrary trace
extension, so if the property accepts traces with undefined
behavior it should also accept their extensions.
For a negative example that is not in Closed≺P , consider the
following formalization of the property S1 from §2, requiring
all writes in the trace to be preceded by a corresponding read:
S1={t | ∀m d x. m; E.write(<d,x>) ≤ t
⇒ ∃m′. m′; E.read;Ret(x) ≤ m}
While property S1 is Safety it is not Closed≺P . Consider the
trace t′ = C0.main();E.write(<d,x>) 6∈ S1 that does a write
without a read and thus violates S1. For S1 to be Closed≺P it
would have to reject not only t′, but also C0.main();Undef(P )
and Undef(P ), which it does not. One can, however, define a
stronger variant of S1 that is in ZP :
S
Z+P
1 ={t|∀m d x.(m;E.write(<d,x>)≤t ∨m;Undef(P )≤t)




1 requires any write or undefined behavior
in P to be preceded by a corresponding read. While this
property is quite restrictive, it does hold (vacuously) for the
strengthened system in Figure 2 when taking P = {C0} and
C = {C1, C2}, since we assumed that C0 has no undefined
behavior.




∀P π∈ZP . (∀CS t. CS [P ] t⇒ t∈π)
⇒ (∀CT t. CT [P↓] t⇒ t∈π)
)
This theorem shows that RSCDC is equivalent to the preser-
vation of all properties in ZP for all P . One might still wonder
how one obtains such robust safety properties in the source
language, given that the execution traces can be influenced
not only by the partial program but also by the adversarial
context. In cases in which the trace records enough information
so that one can determine the originator of each event, as was
the case above, the robust safety property can explicitly talk
only about the events of the program, not the ones of the
context. Moreover, once we add interfaces in §3.3 we will be
able to effectively restrict the context from directly performing
certain events (e.g., certain system calls), and the robust safety
property can then be about these privileged events that the
sandboxed context cannot directly perform.
One might also wonder what stronger property does one
have to prove in the source in order to obtain a certain safety
property π in the target using an RSCDC compiler in the case
in which π is not itself in ZP . Especially when all undefined
behavior is already gone in the target language, it seems
natural to look at safety properties such as S1 6∈ZP above that
do not talk at all about undefined behavior. For S1 above,
we manually defined the stronger property SZ
+
P
1 ∈ZP that is
preserved by an RSCDC compiler. In fact, given any safety
property π we can easily define πZ
+
P that is in ZP , is stronger
than π, and is otherwise as permissive as possible:
πZ
+
P , π ∩ {t | ∀t′. t≺P t′ ⇒ t′∈π}
We can also easily answer the dual question asking what is
left of an arbitrary safety property established in the source
when looking at the target of an RSCDC compiler:
πZ
−
P , π ∪ {t′ | ∃t∈π. t≺P t′ ∨ t′ ≤ t}
3.3 RSCDCMD: Mutually Distrustful Components
RSCDC provides us with a novel model of dynamic compromise
for secure compilation, but is still phrased in terms of protect-
ing a trusted partial program from its untrusted context. We
now extend this model to one protecting any set of mutually
distrustful components running with least privilege from their
untrusted context. Following Juglaret et al.’s work in the
full abstraction setting [43], we start by taking both partial
programs and contexts to be sets of components and linking
a program with a context to be set union. We compile sets of
components by separately compiling each component. Each
component is assigned a well-defined interface that precisely
captures its privilege and components can only interact in
accordance to their interfaces. Most importantly, context back-
translation respects these interfaces: each component of the
target context is mapped back to a source component with
exactly the same interface. As argued by Juglaret et al., the
whole idea of least privilege design crucially relies on the
fact that even if a component is compromised, it does not
immediately get more privilege.
Definition 3.5. A compilation chain provides Robustly Safe
Compilation with Dynamic Compromise and Mutual Distrust
(RSCDCMD) if there exists a back-translation function ↑ taking a
finite trace prefix m and a component interface Ii to a source
component with the same interface, so that for any compatible
interfaces IP and IC we have
∀P :IP . ∀CT :IC . ∀t. (CT ∪ P↓) t⇒ ∀m≤t.
∃t′. ({(m, Ii)↑ | Ii ∈ IC} ∪ P ) t′ ∧ (m≤t′ ∨ t′≺IPm)
This RSCDCMD definition closely follows RSC
DC, but restricts
programs and contexts to two compatible interfaces IP and
IC . The source-level context is obtained by applying the back-
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Figure 4: Our secure compilation chain
3.4 Formalizing RSCC
Using these ideas, we define RSCC as a direct formalization
of the dynamic compromise game previously illustrated in
Figure 3. We use the notation P ∗m when there exists a
trace t that extends m (i.e., m ≤ t) such that P t. We start
with all components being uncompromised and incrementally
replace any component that encounters undefined behavior in
the source with an arbitrary safe component that may now
attack the remaining components. Formally, this is captured
by the following property:
Definition 3.6. A compilation chain provides Robustly Safe
Compartmentalizing Compilation (RSCC) iff for any compat-
ible interfaces I1, ..., In:
∀C1:I1, ..., Cn:In. ∀m. {C1↓, ..., Cn↓} ∗m⇒
∃Ai1 :Ii1 , ..., Aik :Iik .
(1) ∀j ∈ 1...k. ∃mj . (mj ≺Iij m) ∧ (mj−1 ≺Iij−1 mj) ∧
({C1, ..., Cn}\{Ci1 , ..., Cij−1}∪{Ai1 , ..., Aij−1}) ∗mj
(2) ({C1, ..., Cn}\{Ci1 , ..., Cik}∪{Ai1 , ..., Aik}) ∗m
This says that Ci1 , ..., Cik constitutes a compromise se-
quence corresponding to finite prefix m produced by a
compiled set of components {C1 ↓, ..., Cn ↓}. In this com-
promise sequence each component Cij is taken over by
the already compromised components at that point in time
{Ai1 , ..., Aij−1} (part 1). Moreover, after replacing all the
compromised components {Ci1 , ..., Cik} with their corre-
sponding source components {Ai1 , ..., Aik} the entire m can
be reproduced in the source language (part 2).
This formal definition allows us to play an iterative game
in which components that encounter undefined behavior be-
come compromised and attack the remaining uncompromised
components. This is the first security definition in this space
to support both dynamic compromise and mutual distrust,
whose interaction is subtle and has eluded previous attempts at
characterizing the security guarantees of compartmentalizing
compilation as extensions of fully abstract compilation [43]
(further discussed in §6).
4 Securely Compiling from a Simple C-like
Language to a Compartmentalized Machine
We now start describing the compilation chain that we have
developed in Coq to illustrate RSCC and that is depicted in
Figure 4. The source language is a simple unsafe imperative
language with buffers, procedures, and components that is first
compiled to a variant of RISC assembly with compartmental-
ized memory and protected call stack, our compartmentalized
machine. The compilation chain continues with one of two
back ends that implement two different security enforcement
mechanisms on two slightly different RISC machines. The SFI
Back End targets a Bare-Metal Machine that implements a
simple architecture without any protection mechanisms. In-
stead, the code generated by the SFI back end is instrumented
to enforce compartmentalization. The Micro-Policies Back
End targets a Micro-Policies Machine that provides hardware
acceleration for tag-based reference monitors. In this section
we describe in detail the compiler while the back ends are
discussed in the next section §5. Despite the simplifications
needed to manage the complexity of the secure compilation
proof (§A and §B), we believe that this design can be scaled
to a realistic compiler such as CompCert in the future.
We first introduce the definitions that are common to both
source and compartmentalized machine, such as components
and the block-based memory model. We then describe the
details of the two languages and then the compiler. We have
proved that the compiler provides RSCC (§B) using a generic
proof technique (§A). The confidence in the security of our
system comes from the fact the both the implementation of
the compiler and most of the proofs are mechanized in Coq.
4.1 Common Notions
We now illustrate the common infrastructure for the source
and compartmentalized machine, in particular they share the
same notion of program, values, and memory model.
Programs and Interfaces A program is a triplet (Is,
procs, bufs) composed of an interface, a set of procedures
and a set of static buffers. Interfaces Is contain the names of
the procedures that the component exports to and imports from
other components. procs contains all the code of the com-
ponent organized in procedures. bufs are statically allocated
buffers, during execution more buffers can be allocated. We
further assume that code cannot be modified during runtime.
The steps for executing a linked program consist for each
component in: checking that exports are matched with a
procedure in its procs, checking that all imports are satisfied
by some linked component and finally populating the memory
with the static bufs.
Block-Based Memory Model The memory model for both
source and compartmentalized machine is the same and it is a
slightly simplified version of the one used in CompCert [55].
Each component has an infinite memory that is composed
of finite blocks, each block being an array of values. This
is reflected in the structure of pointers which are composed
of three elements (C, b, o): the identifier of the component
which owns the block, the unique block identifier and the
offset inside the block. The system provides a special operation
alloc for obtaining fresh blocks; this operation never fails.
For simplicity there is no free operation, but we could add
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it in the future. Pointers are unforgeable capabilities and can
only be produced by alloc. For now our components are not
allowed to exchange pointers, as a result components cannot
access each others’ memories at this level. In both languages
arithmetic operations on pointers are limited to increasing
and decreasing the offset, equality and comparison. Pointers
cannot be cast to or from integers and derefencing an integer
is undefined behavior. This very abstract memory model is
mapped to a more realistic flat address space in the back ends.
Values The languages manipulate mathematical integers,
pointers and an additional undefined value >.
Definition 4.1 (Values). v ::= n | (C, b, o) | >
The undefined value > is obtained when reading from an
uninitialized piece of memory, as result of an erroneous binary
operation or when reading a register in the compartmentalized
machine after obtaining control from another component.
Events Following CompCert, we use a labeled operational
semantics where events include all interactions of the program
with the external world, such as system calls. We introduce ex-
tra events to keep track of any interaction between components
and in particular any passing of control from one component to
another. Every call to an exported procedure produces a visible
event C Call P(n) C’, where the caller C calls procedure P
of component C ′ passing argument n. All other computations,
including calls to non-exported procedures, are invisible in
the program trace and result in silent steps in the operational
semantics. We use the same events for our source language
and the compartmentalized machine.
4.2 Source Language
Our source is a simple unsafe imperative language with
buffers, procedures, and components. Memory is manually
managed and, like in C, out of bounds accesses lead to
undefined behavior. An attacker can exploit these undefined
behaviors and perform attacks lower in the compilation chain.
The language is expression-based and the syntax of expres-
sions is given in Figure 5. Each procedure body is a single
expression whose result value is returned to the caller. Internal
and external calls share the same global, protected call stack.
Some aspects of the language are simplified: for instance, each
component has a single static buffer local that is also used
for the global variables of the component. More buffers can
be created dynamically with alloc.
4.3 The Compartmentalized Machine
Our design goal for the compartmentalized machine language
was to be as low-level as possible while still allowing us to
target the two back ends presented later in §5. The resulting
language showed in Figure 7 is a simple RISC assembly
with two main abstractions: the block-based memory model
and support for cross-component calls. The memory model
remains the same as for the source leaving the back ends
complete freedom in their layout of blocks. One important
difference compared to the source is the presence of registers
e ::= v values
| local local static buffer
| e ⊗ e binary operations
| e ; e sequence
| if e then e else e conditional
| alloc e memory allocation
| !e dereferencing
| e1 := e2 assignment
| C.P(e) procedure call
| exit terminate
Figure 5: Syntax of source language expressions
which are the only shared state between components at this
level. In the syntax, l represent labels that are resolved to
pointers in the next compilation phase.
Unlike in the source language, there are two kinds of call
stacks: an explicit global stack for cross-component calls and
an implicit one local to each component for intra-component
calls. In addition to the usual Jal and Jump instructions,
used to compile procedure calls and returns private to one
component, we introduce two special instructions, Call and
Return, for cross-component calls. These special instructions
are the only ones that can manipulate the global call stack.
The two back ends will implement this abstract call discipline
in different ways using only standard RISC instructions.
The operational semantics rules for call and return are
presented in Figure 6. A state is composed of the current
executing component C, the protected stack σ, the memory
mem, the registers reg and the program counter pc. If the
instruction fetched from the program counter is a Call to
procedure P of component C ′, the semantics produces an
event α recording the caller, the callee, the procedure and
its argument, which is stored in register R_COM. The protected
stack σ is updated with a new frame containing the next point
in the code of the current component. Registers are mostly
invalidated at calls; reg> has all registers set to > and only
two registers are passed on. R_COM contains the procedure’s
argument and R_RA contains the return address. There is a
redundancy between the protected stack and R_RA precisely
because during the return the protected frame is used to
verify that the register is used correctly; otherwise the program
has an undefined behavior. Invalidation of registers follows
the intuition that nothing left from another component should
be relied upon and forces the compiler to save and restore
correctly the registers that are needed.
Compiler Our compiler transforms the source programs to
compartmentalized machine instructions in the simplest pos-
sible way, to ease reasoning. In particular, it does not perform
any optimizations.
4.4 RSCC Theorem
Theorem 4.2 (RSCC). This section’s compiler satisfies RSCC.
5 Implementing Compartmentalized Machine
In this section we describe the second part of our compilation
chain, the two back ends that securely enforce the abstractions
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fetch[pc] = Call C ′ P C 6= C ′
P ∈ C.import pc′ = E[C ′][P ]
reg′ = reg>[R COM← reg[R COM], R RA← pc + 1]
α = C Call(P, reg[R COM]) C ′
(C, σ,mem, reg, pc) α−→ (C ′, (pc + 1) :: σ,mem, reg′, pc′)
fetch(pc) = Return C 6= C ′
reg[R RA] = pc′
reg′ = reg>[R COM← reg[R COM]]
α = C Return(reg[R COM]) C ′
(C, pc′ :: σ,mem, reg, pc) α−→ (C ′, σ,mem, reg′, pc′)
Figure 6: Compartmentalized machine operational semantics
instr ::= Nop | Halt | Jal l
| Const i -> r | Jump r
| Mov rs -> rd | Call C P
| BinOp r1⊗r2 -> rd | Return
| Load *rp -> rd | Bnz r l
| Store *rp <- rs | Alloc r1 r2
Figure 7: Syntax of compartmentalized machine instructions
of the compartmentalized machine against realistic machine-
code-level attackers. This involves protecting the integrity of
component memories as well as enforcing interfaces and the
cross-component call-return discipline.
Our two back ends target variants of a simple RISC
machine. In contrast to the abstract block-based memory
model from the previous section, at this level memory is a
single infinite array addressed via integers, not via unforgeable
capabilities. There is no magic Alloc instruction; instead, each
back end has to position the blocks in the shared address space.
Without proper protection, compromised components can ac-
cess buffers out-of-bounds and overwrite the code or data
of other components. Similarly, while the compartmentalized
machine had Call and Return instructions and a protected
call stack, at the machine-code level components can jump to
arbitrary places in memory, whether they are code or data, and
whether they are meant to be jumped to directly or not.
While both of our back ends extend any undefined behav-
ior in the compartmentalized machine to a trace where the
machine continues execution in some way that respects high-
level abstractions, they achieve this in very different ways.
The SFI back end (§5.1) targets a bare-metal machine that has
no protection mechanisms and implements an inline reference
monitor purely in software, by rewriting code to add address
masking operations that force each component’s writes and
(most) jumps to lie within its own memory. The Micro-policies
back end (§5.2), on the other hand, uses a micro-policies
machine that adds specialized hardware that we program to
implement a tag-based reference monitor for compartmental-
ization. These approaches have complementary advantages:
SFI requires no specialized hardware. Micro-policies often
incur little overhead [26] and given their simplicity are a
good target for formal verification [13]. We hope that other
mechanisms, like capability machines [81], could be used to
implement the same compartmentalized machine in the future.
The main simplification we make here is to use an infinite
address space accessed by mathematical integers, but we hope
to make this more realistic in the future [58].
5.1 Software Fault Isolation
SFI [78] uses software instrumentation to protect memory
regions. The virtual address space is logically split into
segments. The virtual address is a pair segment identifier,
offset in the segment. Data and code are kept in different
segments. Each memory update is preceded by a check of
the address’ segment identifier against the segment identifier
of the data segment. If they match, the store can proceed.
A similar scheme is used for the indirect transfer of control
within segments. Special mechanisms, such as jump tables,
are used for the cross-component communication.
The target machine of the SFI back end is a bare-metal
RISC processor with the same instructions as the compartmen-
talization machine except for Call, Return, and Alloc. The
register file contains all the registers from the previous level,
and several registers reserved for the SFI instrumentation.
The SFI compiler back end produces machine-code pro-
grams that must satisfy the following invariants:
1) a component may not write outside its own data memory
2) a component may transfer control outside its code mem-
ory only through exit points allowed by the interface
3) the global, cross-component stack can not be corrupted
The SFI compiler back end uses a special memory layout
and instrumentation sequences to realize the desired isola-
tion of components in the produced program. The maximum
number of components is statically determined. For now, we
assume the output program runs directly on the hardware,
without the assistance of an operating system. We do not
implement dynamic linking or loading, nor system calls.
The memory is logically divided in equal size blocks, called
slots. The address is a positive integer with the least significant
bits reserved for offset, the next least significant for component
identifier, and the rest are slot bits (see Figure 8).
Slot (Unbounded) Component Identifier (2 bits) Offset (12 bits)
Figure 8: Address Example
The even slots are allocated for code and the odd ones for
data. The component zero is reserved for the instrumentation
use: code slots for initialization instructions, and data for the
cross-component stack. An example with three user compo-
nents is shown in Figure 9.
Every Store *rp <- rs instruction in the input is replaced
by the following instruction sequence [78]:
BinOp rp & DataAnd -> RD
BinOp rd | DataOr -> RD
Store *RD <- rs
RD, DataAnd, and DataOr are reserved registers. The RD regis-







1 2 3 1 2 3
Init 
Code Slot 0 Slot 0 Slot 0 Slot 1 Slot 1 Slot 1 Slot 1
Unused Slot 2 Slot 2 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 3 Slot 3 Slot 3
Unused Slot 4 Slot 4 Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 5 Slot 5 Slot 5
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Figure 9: Memory layout of program with 3 user components
component change. The registers DataAnd and DataOr are
shown in Figure 10. The first instruction of the instrumentation
copies the offset and slot from the register rp. The second one
sets the last bit of the slot and the component identifier bits.
Lastly, the memory update is executed.
The instrumentation of the Jump instruction is similar, but
uses different registers. The last four bits of the offset are
always reset as shown by the values of registers CodeAnd and
CodeOr in Figure 10. All valid targets are sixteen memory
word aligned by our back end [57].
Slot Slot LSB Slot CID Offset
DataAnd 1111 1111 1 0 00 1111 1111 1111
CodeAnd 1111 1111 1 0 00 1111 1111 0000
DataOr 0000 0000 0 1 xx 0000 0000 0000
CodeOr 0000 0000 0 0 xx 0000 0000 0000
Figure 10: Masking Registers
The Call instruction is translated as a Jal (jump and link)
instruction followed by a sequence of instructions that restore
the values of the reserved registers. The return address is
available in the RA register at the start of the execution of
a procedure. The component-private procedures have already
been translated by the previous compiler pass. Every procedure
the SFI back end compiles is one that is called externally, and
the return address must be first pushed on the stack. To protect
from spurious pushes, the first instruction generated is a Halt
at an aligned address, followed by a sequence of instructions
that stores the return address on the cross-component stack,
and another one that sets the reserved registers to valid values
for the current component. The Halt guard and the push on
stack sequence are contained in the sixteen-unit block and it
is impossible to start execution in the middle. Any attempt to
corrupt the stack by pushing a forged address will be thwarted
by the Halt guard.
The Return instruction is translated to an aligned sequence:
pop from the protected stack and jump to the retrieved address.
This sequence also fits entirely in a sixteen-unit block, and it is
impossible to prepare a corrupt address in the register, and start
executing from the middle of the block. The protection of the
addresses on the stack itself is realized by the instrumentation
of all the Store and Jump instructions in the program.
We used the QuickChick property-based testing frame-
work [61] to test our three compartmentalization invariants:
(1) no writes outside own memory; (2) no indirect transfer of
control outside memory, unless it is at the address stored at
the top of the control stack; (3) the cross-component stack is
safe. For each property we implemented a test that executes the
following steps: (i) generates a syntactically valid intermediate
program; (ii) compiles it; (iii) executes the compiler’s output in
a simulator and records a property-specific trace; (iv) analyzes
the trace to verify if the property has been violated. After all
the tests passed, we manually injected faults in the compiler
by mutating the instrumentation sequences of the generated
output. We made sure that our testing finds these injected
errors.
5.2 Tag-based Reference Monitor
Our second back end targets a programmable tagged archi-
tecture that allows reference monitors called micro-policies
to be defined in software and accelerated by hardware [13],
[25]. On the micro-policy machine each word of data stored
in memory or in registers receives a large metadata tag that
can reference an arbitrary data structure. On each instruction,
the opcode of the instruction and the tags of the arguments, of
the instruction, and of the program counter are all passed to a
software monitor that decides whether to allow the instruction
and if so produces tags for the results. The positive decisions
of this software monitor are hardware cached, so if a similar
instruction is executed soon enough with the same arguments
then the hardware will allow the request immediately, without
the overhead of running the software monitor.
This enforcement mechanism is flexible enough to allow
implementing a broad range of tag-based reference monitors
and for many of them imposes a relatively modest impact on
runtime (typically under 10%) and power ceiling (less than
10%), in return for some increase in energy usage (typically
under 40%) and chip area (110%) [25]. Moreover, this mech-
anism is simple enough so that the security of the reference
monitors can be formally verified [11]–[14]. The micro-policy
machine targeted by this back end builds on the “symbolic
machine” that Azevedo de Amorim et al. have defined in
Coq and used to prove the correctness and security of several
micro-policies [11], [13], [14]. This machine allows for micro-
policies to be implemented at a high level of abstraction, using
Coq datatypes for the tags and Coq functions for the behavior
of the monitor.
The code generation and static linking parts of the micro-
policies back end are much simpler than for the SFI one. The
Call and Return instructions are mapped to Jal and Jump.
The Alloc instruction is mapped to a monitor service that tags
the allocated memory according to the calling component.
A more interesting part of the micro-policies back end is
tagging memory in the (static) loader based on metadata from
the previous compilation stages. Memory tags are records
of the form {vtag = tv, color = c, entry = cs}. The vtag
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field stores the tag of the payload value. The color field
stores a component identifier c, which we call a color, of
the component that owns the memory location. Our monitor
forbids any attempt to write to memory if the color of the
current instruction is different from the color of the target
location. The entry field stores a (by default empty) set of
colors identifying all the components that are allowed to
call to this location. The value tags used by our monitor
distinguish return addresses from all other words in the system:
tv ::= Ret(n) | Any. To enforce the stack discipline return
addresses are treated as linear return capabilities, i.e., unique
capabilities that cannot be duplicated and that can only be used
to return once [74]. This is achieved by giving return addresses
tags of the form Ret(n), where the natural number n represents
the stack level to which this capability can return. We keep
track of the current stack level using the label of the program
counter: tpc ::= Level(n). Calls increment the counter n, while
returns decrement it. A global invariant of the system is that
when the stack is at Level(n) there is at most one capability
Ret(m) for any level m from 0 up to n−1.
Our tag-based reference monitor for compartmentalization
is simple. For Mov, Store, and Load the monitor makes the
tags follow the values, but for return addresses the linear capa-
bility tag Ret(n) is moved from the source to the destination.
Store operations are only allowed if the color of the changed
location matches the one of the currently executing instruction.
Bnz is restricted to the current component. Jal is only allowed
if the color of the current component is included in the allowed
entry points; in this case and if we are at some Level(n) the
machine puts the return address in register RA and the monitor
gives it tag Ret(n) and it increments the pc tag to Level(n+1).
Jump is allowed either to the current component or using a
Ret(n) capability, but only if we are at Level(n+1); if this
is case the pc tag is decremented to Level(n) and the Ret(n)
capability is destroyed. Instruction fetches are also checked to
ensure that one cannot switch components by continuing to
execute past the end of a code region.
6 Related Work
Fully Abstract Compilation, introduced in seminal work
by Abadi [2], is phrased in terms of protecting two partial
program variants written in a safe source language, when these
are compiled and linked with a malicious target-level context
that tries to distinguish the two variants. This original attacker
model differs substantially from the one we consider in this
paper, which protects the trace properties of multiple mutually-
distrustful components written in an unsafe source language.
Abadi [2] and later Kennedy [46] identified failures of full
abstraction in the Java and C# compilers. Abadi et al. [3]
proved full abstraction of a secure channel implementation
using cryptography. Ahmed et al. [8]–[10], [60] proved the full
abstraction of type-preserving compiler passes for functional
languages. Abadi and Plotkin [5] and Jagadeesan et al. [40]
expressed the protection provided by address space layout
randomization as a probabilistic variant of full abstraction.
Fournet et al. [28] devised a fully abstract compiler from
a subset of ML to JavaScript. More recently, Patrignani et
al. [52], [62] studied fully abstract compilation to machine
code, starting from single modules written in simple, ideal-
ized object-oriented and functional languages and targeting a
hardware enclave mechanism similar to SGX.
Modular, Fully Abstract Compilation. Patrignani et
al. [64] subsequently proposed a “modular” extension of their
compilation scheme to protecting multiple components from
each other. The attacker model they consider is again different
from ours: instead of trying to restrict the scope of undefined
behavior in the source, they focus on separate compilation
of safe languages and aim to protect linked target-level
components that are observationally equivalent to compiled
components. This could be useful, for example, when hand-
optimizing assembly produced by a secure compiler. In another
thread of work, Devriese et al. [21], [23] proved modular
full abstraction by approximate back-translation in Coq for
a compiler from simply typed to untyped λ-calculus.
Beyond Good and Evil. The work closest to ours is that
of Juglaret et al. [43], who also aim at protecting mutually
distrustful components written in an unsafe language. They
adapt fully abstract compilation to components, but observe
that defining observational equivalence for programs with
undefined behavior is highly problematic. For instance, are
the following partial programs observationally equivalent?
int buf [ 5 ] ; return buf [ 4 2 ] ?∼ int buf [ 5 ] ; return buf [ 4 3 ]
They both encounter undefined behavior by accessing a buffer
out of bounds, so at the source level they cannot be distin-
guished. However, in a memory unsafe language, the compiled
versions of these programs will very likely read (out of
bounds) different values from memory and encounter different
behaviors. Juglaret et al. avoid this problem by imposing a
strong limitation on the components for which protection is
guaranteed: a set of components is protected only if it cannot
encounter undefined behavior in any context. This amounts
to a static model of compromise: any component that can
possibly be compromised during execution has to be treated
as compromised from the start. Our aim here is to show that,
by moving away from full abstraction and by restricting the
temporal scope of undefined behavior, we can support a more
flexible dynamic compromise model. As discussed below, this
also makes our security criterion easier to achieve in practice
and to prove at scale.
Robustly Safe Compilation. Our criterion builds on Ro-
bustly Safe Compilation (RSC), recently proposed by Garg et
al. [29], who study several secure compilation criteria that are
similar to fully abstract compilation, but that are phrased in
terms of preserving hyperproperties [20] (rather than observa-
tional equivalence) against an adversarial context. In particular,
RSC is equivalent to preservation of robust safety, which has
been previously employed for the model checking of open
systems [49], the analysis of security protocols [32], and
compositional verification [71].
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Though RSC is a bit less extensional than fully abstract
compilation (since it is stated in terms of execution traces),
it is easier to achieve. In particular, because it focuses on
safety instead of confidentiality, the code and data of the
protected program do not have to be hidden, allowing for
more efficient enforcement, e.g., there is no need for fixed
padding to hide component sizes, no cleaning of registers when
passing control to the context (unless they store capabilities),
and no indirection via integer handlers to hide pointers; cross-
component reads can be allowed and can be used for passing
large data. We believe that in the future we can obtain a
more practical notion of confidentiality by adopting Garg et
al.’s [29] robust hypersafety preservation criterion [29].
While RSC serves as a solid base for our work, the
challenges of protecting unsafe low-level components from
each other are unique to our setting, since, like fully abstract
compilation, RSC is about protecting a partial program written
in a safe source language against low-level contexts. Our
contribution is extending RSC to reason about the dynamic
compromise of components with undefined behavior, taking
advantage of the execution traces to detect the compromise of
components and to rewind the execution along the same trace.
Proof Techniques. Garg et al. [29] observe that, to prove
RSC, it suffices to back-translate individual finite trace pre-
fixes, but they provide no details on how to carry out such a
proof. Our RSCDCMD proof technique from §A is thus also the
first proof technique for RSC, although further simplifications
should be possible with a safe source language. Even without
further simplifications, our proof technique is simple and
scalable, especially when compared to previous full abstraction
proofs. While many proof techniques have been previously
investigated [3], [5], [9], [10], [23], [28], [40], [60], fully
abstract compilation proofs are notoriously difficult, even for
very simple languages, with apparently simple conjectures
surviving for decades before being finally settled [22]. The
proofs of Juglaret et al. [43] are no exception: while their
compiler is similar to the one in §4, their full abstraction-based
proof is significantly more complex than our RSCDCMD proof.
Both proofs give semantics to partial programs in terms of
traces, as was proposed by Jeffrey and Rathke [41] and adapted
to low-level target languages by Patrignani and Clarke [63].
However, in our setting the partial semantics is given a one
line generic definition and is related to the complete one by
two standard simulation proofs, which is much simpler than
proving a “trace semantics” fully abstract.
Verifying Low-Level Compartmentalization. Recent suc-
cesses in formal verification have focused on showing cor-
rectness of low-level compartmentalization mechanisms based
on software fault isolation [57], [85] or tagged hardware [13].
This work only considers the correctness of low-level mecha-
nisms in isolation, not how a secure compilation chain makes
use of these mechanisms to provide security reasoning princi-
ples for code written in a higher-level programming language
with components. However, a step in this direction is underway
in ongoing work by Wilke et al. [82] on a variant of CompCert
with SFI, based on previous work by Kroll et al. [48]; we
believe that RSCC or RSCDC could provide good top-level
theorems for such an SFI compiler. In most work on verified
compartmentalization [13], [57], [85], communication between
low-level compartments is done by jumping to a specified set
of entry points; the mode considered here is more structured
and enforces the correct return discipline. Skorstengaard et al.
have also recently investigated a secure stack-based calling
convention for a simple capability machine [70]; they plan to
simplify their calling convention using a notion of linear return
capability [69] that seems similar in spirit to the one used in
our micro-policy from §5.2.
Attacker Models for Dynamic Compromise. While our
model of dynamic compromise is specific to secure compila-
tion of unsafe languages, related notions of compromise have
been studied in the setting of cryptographic protocols, where,
for instance, a participant’s secret keys could inadvertently be
leaked to a malicious adversary, who could then use them to
impersonate the victim [15], [16], [27], [33]. This model is also
similar to Byzantine behavior in distributed systems [18], [51],
in which the “Byzantine failure” of a node can cause it to start
behaving in an arbitrary way, including generating arbitrary
data, sending conflicting information to different parts of the
system, and pretending to be a correct node.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced RSCC, a new formal criterion for secure
compilation providing strong security guarantees despite the
dynamic compromise of components with undefined behavior.
This criterion gives a precise meaning to informal terms
like dynamic compromise, mutual distrust, and privilege used
by proponents of compartmentalization, and it offers a solid
foundation for reasoning about security of practical compart-
mentalized applications and secure compiler chains.
Formally Secure Compartmentalization for C. Looking
ahead, we hope to apply RSCC to the C language by devel-
oping a provably secure compartmentalizing compiler chain
based on the CompCert compiler. Though scaling up to the
whole of C will certainly entail further challenges: defining a
variant of C with components, efficiently enforcing compart-
mentalization all the way down, lowering the cost of formal
verification, etc.
Verifying Compartmentalized Applications. It would also
be interesting to build verification tools based on RSCC
and to use these tools to analyze the security of practical
compartmentalized applications. Effective verification on top
of RSCC will, however, require good ways for reasoning about
the exponential number of dynamic compromise scenarios.
Promising approaches that one could try to adapt to dynamic
compromise include Jia et al.’s System M [42], and Devriese et
al.’s logical relations [24], both of which allow bounding the
behavior of a component based on its interface or capabilities.
Dynamic Component Creation. Another interesting exten-
sion would be supporting dynamic component creation. This
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would make crucial use of our dynamic compromise model,
since components would no longer be statically known, and
thus static compromise would not apply, unless one restricts
component creation to a special initialization phase [59].
Preserving Confidentiality and Hypersafety. Extending our
enforcement mechanisms from preserving robust safety to
confidentiality and hypersafety [20], [29] will be challenging,
especially so if low-level contexts can observe time.
More Interesting Privilege Restrictions. Our proof-of-
concept compilation chain used a very simple notion of
interface to statically restrict the privileges of components.
This could, however, be extended to more interesting dynamic
mechanisms such as history-based access control [1].
Acknowledgments This work is in part supported by ERC
Starting Grant SECOMP (715753), by NSF award 1513854,
Micro-Policies: A Framework for Tag-Based Security Monitors
and by DARPA’s System Security Integrated Through Hard-
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14
Appendix
A Generic Proof Technique for RSCC
We propose an effective and general proof technique for RSCC
(§A) by showing that it follows from RSCDCMD (§A.1) and
that RSCDCMD can be proved (§A.2) by: (1) constructing, from
any target-level trace that records cross-component calls and
returns, a whole source-level program producing that trace;
(2) using standard simulation proofs to show trace decom-
position and composition lemmas that relate our semantics
for whole programs to generically constructed semantics that
work on partial programs; and (3) using a whole-program
compiler correctness proof à la CompCert [54] as a black-
box for moving back and forth between the source and
target languages. This yields significantly simpler proofs than
previous work in this space [43], [64], which gives us hope
that they can be scaled in the future to something as large
as a secure variant of CompCert. Moreover, our technique
for proving RSCDCMD is not so specific to unsafe languages;
we expect it can be easily simplified in the future to provide
scalable proofs of vanilla RSC when the source is safe [29].
A.1 RSCDCMD implies RSCC
As a first step towards proving RSCC, we show that RSCC
can be obtained by iteratively applying RSCDCMD. This proof
crucially relies on back-translation in RSCDCMD being performed
pointwise and respecting interfaces, as explained in §3.3.
Theorem A.1. RSCDCMD implies RSCC.
We proved this by defining a non-constructive function
that produces the compromise sequence Ai1 , ..., Ai1 by case
analysis on the disjunction in the conclusion of RSCDCMD (using
excluded middle in classical logic). If m ≤ t′ we are done
and we return the sequence we accumulated so far, while if
t′≺Pm we obtain a new compromised component ci : Ii that
we back-translate using (m, Ii) ↑ and add to the sequence
before iterating this process.
A.2 Proving RSCDCMD
In order to prove RSCDCMD we have designed a general proof
strategy that relies on a few key properties of the source and
target languages and their compiler. In the next section (§B)
we show how to prove each property for our compiler to
obtain RSCDCMD for it. One advantage of our proof technique
is the use of a compiler that supports separate compilation but
only guarantees correctness for whole programs, which is what
CompCert provides for example [45]. This constraint slightly
complicates the proof but will allow us to more easily tap into
the CompCert infrastructure in the future.
The intuition behind RSCDCMD (Definition 3.5) is that a
programmer working on a partial program P should not be
concerned with the specific CT that will be linked with their
compiled P . Ideally they should only worry about the trace
of observable events of CT and imagine a source context
CS that, interacting with P , could produce that trace. The
compiler guarantees that any target trace can be expressed in
the source, or conversely that the target is limited to source
traces, allowing the programmer to reason only in the source
language which he is familiar with. On one side we want to
abstract away a specific context CT and only keep the finite
trace prefix m it produces, on the other we want to turn m
into a concrete program CS . Following this intuition, our proof
technique is based on two main ideas: a partial semantics to
execute the target context along a trace prefix separately from
the compiled program and a definability technique to create a
new source program from that finite trace prefix. Additionally
the proof uses two standard properties of correct compilers to
preserve the traces of complete programs.
Partial Semantics The purpose of a partial semantics is to
characterize the traces of a partial program P when linked
with any context satisfying an interface. This corresponds to
the semantics that a programmer has in mind while developing
P and imagining the interactions that are possible with the
context. When the program is running, the execution is the
same as in the normal operational semantics of the language,
but when the control is passed to the context, an action com-
patible with its interface is non-deterministically selected and
executed. This models all possible concrete implementations
of the context interface, all of which need to be taken into
account to characterize the possible traces of P .
We define our partial semantics generically for any lan-
guage, with respect to the complete small-step operational
semantics of a complete program C ∪P , which we denote as
α−→ and define over complete states cs. Each concrete execution
step is labeled with an action α that is either an event or a silent
action τ . We define a partialization function par that, given a
complete state cs and the interface IC of C, returns a partial
state ps where information regarding C has been erased. For
instance, in our particular instance from §4 partialization erases
the memories and the stack frames belonging to C (among
other things). Given partial states produced by par we define
the partial operational semantics α−⇀ over them.
par(cs, Ic) = ps par(cs





The partial semantics can step with action α from the partial
state ps to ps′, if there exists a corresponding transition in
the complete semantics whose states partialize to ps and ps′.
We denote with P IC t that the partial program P linked
with any context with interface IC produces the trace t in the
partial semantics after a complete finite or infinite execution.
The partial semantics has a different behavior depending on
which part of the complete program is running. When the
program has control there is a perfect match between partial
and complete semantics and if the complete semantics is
deterministic only one reduction is possible. On the contrary
when the context is running, the partial semantics can non-
deterministically pick any complete state compatible with its
interfaces and perform the same action. This leads to a non-
deterministic reduction that captures all possible contexts that
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Figure 11: Our proof schema for RSCDCMD
the program can be linked with and their behavior. The only
constraint is respecting the interfaces.
A consequence of abstracting away part of the program as
non-deterministic actions allowed by its interface is that the
abstracted away part will always have actions it can do and it
will never be stuck, whereas stuckness is the standard way of
modeling undefined behavior. Given P IC t, if t ends with
an undefined behavior, then this was necessarily caused by P ,
which is still a concrete partial program running actual code,
potentially unsafe.
Decomposition is a first property that one has to prove
in order to show that our partial semantics is correct with
respect to its complete counterpart and in particular that the
partialization function is well designed. Decomposition states
that if a program obtained by linking two partial programs
P and C produces a trace t in the complete semantics, then
each of the two partial programs (below we take P , but the
C case is symmetric) can produce a trace t′ in the partial
semantics so that t ≺IC t′ . Because C has been abstracted
away, its behavior is always defined in the partial semantics,
so if t ended in an undefined behavior caused by C the partial
semantics can continue with arbitrary events.
Definition A.2 (Decomposition).
∀P :IP . ∀C:IC . ∀t. (C ∪ P ) t⇒ ∃t′. P IC t′ ∧ t ≺IC t′
One way to prove decomposition is to show that the partial
semantics simulates the complete one.
The converse of decomposition, composition, states that if
two partial semantics with matching interfaces produce the
same trace t, then they can be linked and they produce the
same t in the complete semantics.
Definition A.3 (Composition). For any two compatible inter-
faces IP and IC :
∀P :IP . ∀C:IC ∀t. P IC t ∧ C IP t⇒ (C ∪ P ) t
Our work on partial semantics was partially inspired by
a line of work on co called “trace semantics” [41], [43],
[63], where similarly it is important to decouple a program of
interest from a specific context, of which only the observable
behavior is relevant. One important difference is that our
generic definition of partial semantics in terms of a partializa-
tion function is very general and can be easily instantiated for
different languages. On the contrary previous works defined
“trace semantics” as a large relations with many rules, making
the proofs to correlate partial and complete semantics more
involved. Moreover, by focusing on trace properties (instead
of observational equivalence) composition and decomposition
can be proved using standard simulations à la CompCert,
which is a lot easier than previous proof techniques for fully
abstract “trace semantics.”
Definability is the ability of a semantics to generate the
behaviors specified by a suitable notion of trace. Intuitively it
states that given a viable finite trace there should be a program
that can produce it. A bit more formally, there should be a
back-translation function ↑ that given a viable finite trace m
and the interface I of the program returns a complete program
such that (m, i)↑  m. In §B we describe in more detail an
instance for our source language. It should be noted that it is
not always possible to take an arbitrary sequence of events and
obtain a program that realizes it. For example, in a language
with a call stack and events {call, return}, there is no
program that produces the single event trace return: every
return must be preceded by a call. For this reason we apply
definability only on traces that are produced by one of our
operational semantics, thus leading only to viable traces. In our
case we care about back-translating complete target programs
to source programs so we instantiate definability to take any
finite trace produced by a target program and back-translate it
to a source program that produces the same behavior.
Definition A.4 (Definability).
∃ ↑ . ∀P :IP . ∀m, P T m⇒ (m, IP )↑ S m
The fact that our back-translation function only takes finite
traces as input simplifies our proof technique but at the same
time limits it to only safety properties. While the other prop-
erties from this section can also be proved for infinite traces,
there is no general way to define a finite program that produces
an arbitrary infinite trace. We leave devising scalable back-
translation proof techniques that go beyond safety properties
to future work.
Compiler correctness The last property we need in order
to prove RSCDCMD is compiler correctness. We assume we have
a compiler that has whole-program compiler correctness, both
forward and backward. These two properties are proved in Coq
for the CompCert verified compiler [54]. Intuitively forward
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compiler correctness, FCC, requires that the trace produced by
complete source program P can also be produced by its com-
pilation P↓, and conversely for BCC. Additionally a compiler
for an unsafe language should take into account the possibility
that P might encounter an undefined behavior and that P↓ at
the target can produce an extended trace. Although we require
correctness proof only for whole-programs, the compiler must
be aware of the component structure of programs. In particular
we require that any undefined behavior can be traced to the
component that caused it. As usual, we denote with ≺C that a
trace can be extended only if the component C of the program
causes undefined behavior.
Definition A.5 (Compiler Correctness).
∀P C t. P t⇒ ∃t′. P↓ t′ ∧ t4Ct′ (FCC)
∀P C t′. P↓ t′ ⇒ ∃t. P t ∧ t4Ct′ (BCC)
While we require compiler correctness only for whole-
programs, we also require the compiler to support separate
compilation, that is ∀P C t. (C ∪ P )↓  t ⇔ (C↓ ∪P↓) t.
This is a reasonable property in a setting were components are
present at all levels of the compilation chain and should not
interfere significantly with the correctness proof.
The proof strategy for RSCDCMD We now use the definitions
introduced above to explain our proof technique for RSCDCMD.
This is depicted in the diagram from Figure 11. In the bottom
left corner, we start with a complete target-level program
CT ∪ P ↓ producing a trace with a finite prefix m. Using
definability (Definition A.4) the prefix m is back-translated to
a complete source program CS ∪P ′ that reproduces the prefix
m in the source. The new source program is then compiled
to a target program (CS ∪ P ′) ↓ that by forward compiler
correctness (Definition A.5) produces again the same prefix
m. By separate compilation we can consider CS↓ ∪P ′↓ and
then remove the partial program P ′ ↓ using decomposition
(Definition A.2), leaving only its behavior captured by the
trace m and its interface IP . This somewhat convoluted
process is necessary to guarantee the preservation of behavior
of CS while using a compiler that only guarantees whole-
program correctness. Now that we managed to isolate CS↓,
we can decompose P↓ as well from the original program and
compose the two to obtain a target program CS↓ ∪P↓ which
still preserves m. Lastly we can apply separate compilation to
obtain CS ∪ P↓ and backward compiler correctness to obtain
the source program Cs ∪ P . During the last step however we
must take care as the source program might cause an undefined
behavior. For this reason the obtained trace t′ can relate to
m in two possible ways. Either t′ is an extension of m, in
which case the prefix is guaranteed, or there was a undefined
behavior before m, leading to a t′ shorter than m. In the second
case when the program is compiled there is no guarantee that
the prefix will be preserved after t′. The definition of RSCDCMD
allows for an undefined behavior to shorten the prefix m,
however only in the case that P caused it: we still need to
show that CS doesn’t produce any undefined behavior before
m. Again to analyze the behavior of CS alone we apply
decomposition and look at its behavior in the partial semantics
where the abstract part can’t produce undefined behavior. We
decompose twice, in the top part of the diagram, once from
CS∪P ′ and once from CS∪P and because the source language
is determinate we obtain the if CS can produce the whole m
on the left, then necessarily if t′ is shorter than m it must be
because of P . Hence t′ ≺P m.
B RSCC Proof for the Compiler from §4
Back-translation function For the source language we have
also developed a ↑ function for which we have proved the
definability property (Definition A.4). The function takes a
finite trace prefix m and a program interface I and returns
a complete source program that respects I and produces m.
The first step is to generate a skeleton of procs that contains
all the components and their public procedures with an empty
body. We then add in bufs a single counter per component
which will keep track of which event the component should
generate next; each component can access its buffer through
!(local+1). The function scans the trace and for every event
adds a snippet of code to the body of the procedure that pro-
duced that event. More precisely, if we are in component C1,
with current procedure P1 and the event is C1 Call(P2,42)
C2, then if this is the first time that C1 performs a call in the
trace t, the added snippet would be
if ( local [ 1 ] == 1) { local [ 1 ] + + ; C2 . P2 ( 4 2 ) ; C1 . P1 ( 0 ) ; }
The code increases the counter so that at the next call, the next
snippet will be executed. It then produces the event required
by the trace, calling the procedure with the right argument.
When returned control, after C2.P2 is done, it calls itself again
and executes the next if branch whose guard is now true
because the counter was bumped. The resulting procedure is
a concatenation of if statements where only one guard is
true every time the component needs to generate an event,
and corresponds to the branch generating exactly that event.
A more complete example with a trace of 5 events and 2
components is shown in Figure 12.
In order to prove that our compiler guarantees RSCDCMD we
show that it provides the properties presented in §A.2 and
apply the general proof schema. Particular care has been taken
to maintain compatibility with CompCert’s proof technique
and data structures and to provide a solid framework for
future developments. The only large proof that we assume
is the correctness of our compiler. Compiler correctness has
been proved for compilers vastly more complex, such as
CompCert, and repeating the exercise for our simple instance
would be time consuming but not very insightful, so it is
left as future work. Assumption (Correctness). We assume the
front-end compiler ↓ provides forward and backward compiler
correctness (Definition A.5).
The largest part of our proofs is devoted to the partial
semantics, one for the source and one for the compart-
mentalized machine. For each we proved composition and
decomposition. These proofs are structured as simulations, a
standard technique and the main one used in CompCert, and
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ECall mainC P1 0 C1
ECall C1 P2 1 C2
ERet C2 2 C1
ECall C1 P2 3 C2
ECall C2 mainP 4 mainC
(a) Trace of 5 events
C1 {
P1 ( _ ) {
if ( local [ 1 ] == 0) {
local [ 1 ] + + ;
C2 . P2 ( 1 ) ;
C1 . P1 ( 0 ) ;
} else if ( local [ 1 ] == 1) {
local [ 1 ] + + ;
C2 . P2 ( 3 ) ;
C1 . P1 ( 0 ) ;
} else {
exit ( ) ;
}
}
} (b) Component 1
C2 {
P2 ( _ ) {
if ( local [ 1 ] == 0) {
local [ 1 ] + + ;
return 2 ;
} else if ( local [ 1 ] == 1) {
local [ 1 ] + + ;
mainC . mainP ( 4 ) ;
C2 . P2 ( 0 ) ;
} else {





Figure 12: Example of program with two components back-translated from a trace of 5 events.
require care especially when dealing with silent steps. This
part of the development is very general and can easily be
applied to different instances.
Theorem A.6 (Partial Semantics). The source language and
compartmentalized machine partial semantics defined as in
§A.2 provide decomposition (Definition A.2) and composition
(Definition A.3).
We then show that the back-translation function (B) indeed
respects definability. The proof is composed of two main parts,
the first showing the program produces a viable trace, the
second showing that the output of back-translation function
can indeed reproduce any viable trace.
Theorem A.7 (Definability). The generator function ↑ provides
definability (Definition A.4).
Theorem A.8 (RSCC). The compiler from §4 satisfies RSCC.
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[25] U. Dhawan, C. Hriţcu, R. Rubin, N. Vasilakis, S. Chiricescu, J. M. Smith,
T. F. Knight, Jr., B. C. Pierce, and A. DeHon. Architectural support for
software-defined metadata processing. ASPLOS, 2015.
[26] U. Dhawan, C. Hritcu, R. Rubin, N. Vasilakis, S. Chiricescu, J. M.
Smith, T. F. K. Jr., B. C. Pierce, and A. DeHon. Architectural support
for software-defined metadata processing. ASPLOS, 2015.
[27] C. Fournet, A. Gordon, and S. Maffeis. A type discipline for authoriza-
tion in distributed systems. CSF. 2007.
[28] C. Fournet, N. Swamy, J. Chen, P.-É. Dagand, P.-Y. Strub, and
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